AN EMBEDDING OF CLASSICAL LOGIC IN S4
MELVIN FITrING ?1. IntrOductiOn. There are well-known embeddings of intuitionistic logic into S4 and of classical logic into S5. In this paper we give a related embedding of (first order) classical logic directly into (first order) S4, with or without the Barcan formula. If one reads the necessity operator of S4 as 'provable', the translation may be roughly stated as: truth may be replaced by provable consistency. A proper statement will be found below. The proof is based ultimately on the notion of complete sequences used in Cohen's technique of forcing [1] , and is given in terms of Kripke's model theory [3] , [4] .
In [6] McKinsey and Tarski defined a translation from nonmodal to modal propositional formulas, which has been extended to first order formulas by Prawitz [7] . See also Schutte [8] . The following is a variant of that translation. 
That is, to apply 0 to a formula is to put [l before every subformula. Letting I be first order intuitionistic logic, C be first order classical logic, S4 be first order S4 (see, e.g. Schuttte [8]), and S5 be first order S5, Fz X iff Ago X0, TIC X iff FS5 X?.
REMARK.
In the more customary version of this translation the corresponding cases above are replaced by
That either version may be used follows easily by an induction on degree together with
We define an analogous translation from nonmodal to modal formulas as follows:
If A is atomic, let A* = ZOA, and let
That is, to apply * to a formula is to put 00 before every subformula. Let C and S4 be as above. Let T be the trivial modal logic in which OKX X X X. We will show THEOREM. For any nonmodal formula X, and any modal logic L such that S4 ' L C T, FcXiffFLX*. A few words about the origin and significance of this translation may be in order. In [2] we showed that, suitably interpreted, the notion of a Kripke model for intuitionistic logic could replace the notion of forcing for obtaining the Cohen independence results in set theory. (A connection between the two notions was first remarked in [5] .) The transition between intuitionistic logic and classical logic used there was the well-known theorem FC X if f -'X where X contains no universal quantifiers. Instead of intuitionistic logic models, S4 models could have been used. Thus, one can produce a Kripke S4 model in which if A is an axiom of ZF, A* is valid, but [-(V -L)]* is also. Then the theorem stated above provides the classical independence of the axiom of constructibility. (rk [1 OX is analogous to 'X is weakly forced'.)
We give a purely semantic proof of the theorem although a proof theoretic one is possible (and not difficult). We feel that a semantic proof frees us of the peculiarities of a particular formalization, as well as being of interest for its own sake. For convenience, we will continue to use the symbol I, but it may be read as asserting validity rather than provability.
?2. Model theory preliminaries. The notion of a Kripke S4 model is from [3] , [4] ; the definition is stated here to establish notation, which is based on [2] . We use formulas with parameters. We will use x, y, for variables, and a, b,*** for parameters. 'Formula' means closed formula, i.e. with no free variables.
We use the convention that if 9 is a map ranging over sets of parameters, Y5(x) is the set of all formulas with parameters from Y(x).
By an S4 model we mean an ordered quadruple <. 9P, 1, > where 9 is a nonempty set, .B is a reflexive, transitive relation on 9, b is a map from elements of T to nonempty sets of parameters satisfying, for any P, r* e 9, rPwr* => s(r) c 9(r*), and l is a relation between elements of C and formulas, having the following properties (we use V for not-k): for any r E C: 
r P (Vx)X(x) if P I X(a) for all a E M(r), (6) r V (3x)X(x) iff r P X(a) for some a E 9(r), (7) r POX iff for all r* E C such that FF*, * X., (8) r P oX iff for some ]P* e 9 such that FPr? J* V x.
A motivation for this model theory is the following. C is the collection of all possible states of affairs. To say rPlP* is to say if r is the situation now, r* might be the situation later. Y4(P) is the collection of all objects existing in F. F A Xmeans, in the situation F, X is true.
A formula X is valid in the S4 model. <S, .R, k, b> if, for each r E O, such that X e (r), I' k x. A proof may be found in [3] , [4] We will use the convention that in the model <S9, P, I, b>, for r E a, F* will stand for an arbitrary element of C such that rPMr*.
We use the term truth set modified from Smullyan [9] as follows. Let P be some nonempty set of parameters. We call a set 9-of nonmodal formulas a truth set with respect to P if, for any nonmodal formulas X and Y with all parameters from P.
(1) (X A Y) e.f iff Xe. 9and Ye.Y,
iff Xe or Ye , (3) (X' Y)e9 if X0 or YeJ, (4) (-X) 'eS iff X J, (5) (Vx)X(x) e .f iff X(a) E Y for all a E P, (6) (3x)AX(x) E 9-iff X(a) E .Y for some a E P. For any nonmodal formula X, Fc X if and only if X belongs to any set 9-which is a truth set with respect to some P where P includes at least all the parameters of X.
?3. Proof of the embedding theorem. We now proceed with a proof of the theorem of ?1. The principal half of the proof is based on the proof in [2] of a connection between intuitionistic and classical logic, which in turn was based on the notion of complete sequences in Cohen [1] . It somewhat resembles the Henkin completeness-proof for classical logic.
We begin with the simpler half of the proof. THEOREM 1. Let X be any modal formula and let X# be like X except that all occurrences of ED and 2o have been deleted. Then if FT X, Fc X#.
PROOF.
If Vc X#, by the result stated in ?2, there is a set of parameters P. including those of X#, and a truth set 5 with respect to P, such that X# ? S. We construct a Tmodel <S, I, b1 > as follows. Let C = {S}, let .9-9 , let Y'(S) = P. If A is atomic, let 9T 1 A if A E S.. I may be extended uniquely to all formulas in such a way that <S, A, I, Y> is a model. Clearly, for any Z E A(), 9 j oZ iff Y-1 OZ iff Y F Z. It then follows that ! 1 Z# iff 9 I Z. Furthermore, since Z# is nonmodal, Y k Z# iff Z# E .f. Hence V M X, but Xe f(9), so VT X.
COROLLARY. Let X be any nonmodal formula. If FT X*, then Fc X. Before proceeding with the converse, let us define X' to be like X* but without the initial occurrence of ULO. Thus X* = 00X'. LEMMA 1. Let <9, a, k, by> be any S4 model. Let r E C and X -(r) where X is a nonmodalformula. Then (1) P h X* =>for every r*, r* I x*, (2) P V X* =,-for some r*, ]7* h (,X)* (3) P I [(3x)X(x)]* for some r* andfor some a E 9(r*), jr* P [X(a)]*, (4) (1) Since X* begins with an occurrence of El, and r I ElY implies P* P C1 Y, this is immediate.
(2) If r V x*, r V Eolx. Then for some r*, 17* P l--X'. But s84 OX' D CIo FIoxy, so r* k [no -rOOX', i.e. r* F (-x)*. Let <S, A, I, be> be an S4 model and P E S. We describe the construction of a complete sequence in C beginning with r.
Let X1, X2, X3, ... be an enumeration of all nonmodal formulas. Let P1 = P. Suppose we have defined F,,. Consider X,,. We have several cases.
If X,, 0 Y(F*) for any Fn*, then let rP+= r,,.
If xn E rn*) for some I'*, choose one such r*, call it yn. Case (la). Ycn Thus we have shown that 'W is a truth set with respect to P. THEOREM 2. Let X be any nonmodalformula. If Fc X then FS4 X*. PROOF. Suppose VS4 X*. Then for some model <S, A, I, Y>, for some P E C, x* E" e(r), but F W X*. By Lemma 1, for some r*, r* 1 (a x)*. Construct a complete sequence W beginning with 7*.-X e W SO X ' W. But the above lemmas show that W6 is a classical truth set with respect to P, and all the parameters of X are in P. Thus, as we remarked in ?2, Vc X.
